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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16915

.JERRY LEE VELARDE,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent takes no exception to the Appellant's
Brief under these headings and adopts it for its own statement as to those matters.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant's Statement of the Facts is reasonably
accurate and complete with two exceptions:
Randy Lockwood's identification of the Appellant
was positive not "tentatively" (T. 7).
Dennis Quintana who aided the Appellant in
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transporting the stolen property by cab from 874 East South
Temple to 128 B Street had no doubt in his mind that the
property in question was stolen even though he didn't
question the other two about that (T. 88).
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE GUILTY VERDICTS.
It is well established in Utah that in order
for a convicted defendant to succeed in challenging on
appeal the sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial, he
must establish that the evidence was so inconclusive or
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.
State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978); State v.
Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977); State v. Jones, 554 P.2d
1321 (Utah 1976).

Those cases also establish that in

considering a claim of insufficiency of the evidence on
appeal, this Court must assume that the trier of fact
believed those aspects of

the

evidence and drew such

reasonable inferences therefrom as support the verdict.
Mere possession of recently stolen property,
when not coupled with other culpatory or incriminating
facts, does not alone justify a conviction.
In State v. Kinsey, 66 Utah 348, 295 Pac. 247
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(1931), this Court said:

. . . [p]ossession of articles
recently stolen, when coupled with
circumstances of hiding or concealing
them, or of disposing or attempting to
dispose of them, or of making false or
unreasonable or unsatisfactory
explanations of the possession, may be
sufficient to connect the possessor with
the commission of the offense.
Id. at 249.

Accord, State v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 244

P. 2d 653 (1952).
In State v. Heath, 27 Utah 2d 13, 492 P.2d

978 (1972), the Court said:
[i]n addition to the . . .
possession by the defendant, there must
be proof of corroborating circumstances
tending to themselves to show guilt.
Such corroborating circumstances may
consist of the acts, conduct, falsehoods,
if any, or other declarations, if any, of
the defendant which tend to show his
guilt.
Id. at 979.
Appellant's Brief at page 11 admits "it is
undisputed that subsequently the property was found in
the presence of or in the posssession of Dennis Quintana,
Randy Velarde or appellant, Jerry Lee Velarde or some
combination of these three individuals."

The trial lapse

was only two hours at the outside ("from 2: 00 p.m. until 4: 00
p.m. of the same day)

(Tr. 17, 27".""29).

Appellant here makes no specif·ic attack on the
sufficiency of the evidence but only cites the cases of
Cooper, Mills and Williams as authority that this Court
may use to vacate the judgment entered in this cause and to
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remand the case to the district court for a new trial.
The State concedes that this Court has such power and
the fact that there was no motion for a new trial would
not present a barrier to such relief in a proper case.
What the State does contend is that this is not a proper
case for such relief.
In State v._Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764,
770 (1949), the Court pointed out in that portion of its
opinion quoted by appellant that such relief is to be
granted only when the right to it is "quite clearly
shown."

In this case such right is not shown at all,

much less clearly shown.
In State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P.2d 211
(1952), as appellant noted at page 8 of his brief, the
legal test of insufficiency is "inherently improbable
as to be unworthy of belief."

Here the evidence was not

only worthy of belief but there is in evidence the opinion
of the appellant's companion that on the day in question
there was no doubt in his mind that the subject property
was stolen.

This was Dennis Quintana who testified as

follows:

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

What happened then?
They left.
Who is they?
Randy and Jerry.
How long was this after Jerry got back?
Just a few minutes.
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
owner of

Anybody else leave with them?
No.
And where were you at this time?
In the living room.
Okay, who was there with you?
Me and my friend and their friend, the
the apartment.
Q. And how long do you think they were
gone at this time?
A. Fifteen, twenty minutes.
Q. Did they have anything with them
when they came back the second time?
A.
Yes. They had some stereo equipment
and things.
Q. Can you be a little bit more specific
in regards to stereo equipment and things?
A. They had speakers, reel to reel and
some cameras. That is all I saw.
Q. Okay. Do you have any idea about
what time this was?
A. I would say it was close to 1:00.
I don't know, we didn't have a clock.
Q.
So sometime in the early afternoon?
A. Yes.
Q.
What happened then then after they
came back to the apartment with this equipement?
A.Well, I was expecting a radio but,
they Qame back with much more. I just kind of
looked at them, you know, and they just sort
of put everything down and looked it over.
Q.
Did you have any conversation in
regards--with them in regards to where
this had come from?
A. Not really.
Q.
Did you overhear them saying anything
in regards to where it had come from?
A. Not that I recall.
Q.
Did you ever ask them any questions
about whether it was theirs or not?
A. No, I didn't.
(Tr . 6 8- 6 9 . )
Q.
Okay. Did you ask them any questions
concerning where this had come from, or what
they were going to do with it?
A. No, I didn't ask no questions.
Q.
Okay. Did you overhear any conversation
with them in regards to where it had come from,
or what they were planning on doing with this
equipment?
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A.
Well, they had planned on selling it.
Q.
Okay.
Well, now, you said they
planned on selling it.
Let me go back.
What did you hear that made you believe that?
A.
Well, they were estimating how much
they could get for the individual pieces.
MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, I am going to
object, Your Honor, and ask that be stricken
from the record unless a proper foundation
has been laid as to who said what.
THE COURT: Let's lay a foundation, Mr.
Fuchs, or we will strike i t all.
Q.
Where were you when you heard this
conversation, where were you all when they
were talking about this?
A.
We were at the apartment on South
Temple.
Q.
Okay, on South Temple still? Okay.
And who was present?
A.
I was, Randy was there, Jerry was
there, and my girlfriend, Cindy was there.
Q.
Okay.
Now, in regards to what they
said about selling, what specifically did you
hear in regards to these matters and who was
specifically involved in this conversation?
Who was the conversation between that you
overheard?
THE COURT: That is the fourth question.
One at a time.
Let's rephrase them one at a
time. Who was present period.
Q.
Who was present?
THE COURT: We have that.
Q.
Okay.
Then, who was the
conversation between?
THE COURT: What time was it to the:best
of his recollection in relation to when they
came back with it.
Q.
What time was it to the best of your
recollection when they came back?
THE COURT: That is how much longer after
they brought it back, or in relation to when
you left there?
A.
About two hours.
Q.
Okay, so this was just before you left
in the cab?

-6-
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A. Yes.
Q. And who had this conversation?
A. Jerry and Randy.
Q. And this conversation was
specifically between those two?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was it exactly that you
overheard?
A. I overheard comments.
MR. VERHOEF: Your Honor, if I could
ask the witness to respond by saying who
said what as opposed to just a general
conversation.
·
THE COURT: Well, he can ask him-tell us who said what.
A.
I couldn't tell you who said what.
I can just tell you the comments that I
heard.
THE COURT:
Those two together?
A. Right.
Q. Would you go ahead and tell us
what you heard?
A. Just they were just trying to name
prices on what they would get for individual
items that they had.
Q. Do you remember any specific prices
that they talked about?
A. They would say could sell a camera for
like a hundred dollars.
(Tr. 72-74.)
Q.
Now, it was this time you thought
in your own mind this property had been stolen?
A. Yes.
Q.
You hadn't known these people at all
prior to this night?
A. Correct.
Q. Yet you didn't ask any questions in
regards to where this property had come from?
A. It wasn't necessary. _
Q.
But, you knew in your own mind it had
been stolen?
A. Correct. Therefore, it wasn't
necessary to ask questions.
Q.
And, you all made just one trip down
to the cab?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember who carried what?
A. I remember I carried a speaker.
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In State v. Williams, 111 Utah 379, 180 P.2d 551
(1947), where a judgment in a rape case involving a 13 year
old subnormal girl whose mental age was between 8 and 10
and who had frequent epileptic seizures was reversed and
the case remanded, the State's evidence was of a totally
different quality than in this case.

There the Court

said immediately following the quote from

Appel~ant's

Brief at page 8:
~This is not to say that merely by
reason- of the fact that the circumstances
surrounding an alleged assault of this
nature created a reasonable doubt in the
mind of this court that the offense was
in fact committed, we will set aside a
verdict.
The total picture presented by
the record here considered must be kept in
mind in evaluating the result here reached.
We have before us not merely a happening
which must be considered not in harmony
with general experience, coupled with the
doubtful testimonial capacity of the only
witness to the principal fact in issue,
but the further fact that such witness
was suffering from an affliction which
itself might account both for her physical
condition and for her story of the improbable
attack.

Id. at 555.
The facts with respect to the credibility of the
State's key witnesses in these two cases are so totally
dissimilar as to be virtually useless as a guiding
precedent in the instant case.
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that reasonable
minds must have entertained reasonable doubt about his guilt.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
State v. Library
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Jones, supra.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY REFUSING TO CHARGE THE JURY WITH
A REQUESTED, REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE
HYPOTHESIS INSTRUCTION.
Respondent respectfully submits that there are
three main situations with respect to the principle of law
that no conviction can be upheld when one of the material
issues is established by circumstantial evidence unless
"such circumstance must reasonably preclude any reasonable
hypothesis of defendant's innocence."
355 P.2d 57 (Utah, 1960) .at 60.

State v. Garcia,

First, when the defendant

offers evidence which the jury might find provides a
reasonable hypothesis consistent with defendant's innocence.
Second, when that_ evidence is "so conclusive that a
reasonable hypothesis of innocence has been proved that a
contrary holding would be beyond the bounds of reason."
Garcia at 60.

Third, when no evidence of such a reasonable

hypothesis is presented.

Appellant submits that the facts

in this case place it within the third category above.
Appellant's reliance on Garcia is misplaced.

Garcia

in dicta approved on a so-called "Hodge Rule" instruction
(without denominating it as such) when one of the material
facts essential to the offense is established by circumstantial
evidence.

Garcia was a direct evidence case.

-9-

It certainly

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

does not stand for the proposition that failure to give
an instruction of the requested type is error when the
evidence of the offense is circumstantial but the defendant
has not presented any evidence from which the jury could
find innocence upon the basis of a reasonable hypothesis
based on the record (situation third above).
The only other authority advanced by appellant in
his brief on this point is State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229
(Utah, 1980).

That case did not involve any requested

jury instruction.

It could not therefore stand for the

proposition that failure to give the requested instruction
is error under these-facts.

In fact, respondent urges

this Court to apply the principle that the Hodge's Rule
is in "reality nothing more than another manner of stating
the burden of proof applicable in all criminal cases,
viz, beyond a reasonable doubt."

(at 232).

There is no

contention here that the jury was not correctly instructed
as to that burden.

The record shows it was (R.128).

The Lamm case in equating the above principle with
the instruction as to proof beyond a reasonable doubt said:
"The key word in either concept is that of 'reasonable'."
As noted above the appellant did not establish any
reasonable hypothesis in the record.

Likewise, none is set
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forth in his brief.

In short no reasonable hypothesis

of innocence exists in this case and hence the court's
refusal to give the requested instruction was not error.
Appellant impliedly concedes that the receiving
stolen property was not based on circumstantial evidence
as to any of its elements.

See Appellant's Brief, page 11,

where the attack on the refusal to instruct as requested
refers only to the burglary charge.

This is important

because the requested instruction would .have been improper

if the offense tried related only to receiving stolen
property.

Appellant respectfully submits that the trial

judge properly exercised his discretion in not giving the
subject instruction as he may have correctly concluded that
it would be unduly confusing to the jury to be asked to
apply that instruction as to the one offense charged and
not as to the other.

Such caution was particularly

appropriate in light of cautionary note as to such
instructions in Garcia, p. 60.

This requires care to use

language which the jury would understand and which would
not merely.lend to their confusion.
Even if this Court determines that failure to
give such an instruction was error under the facts of this
case, appellant submits it was harmless error.

-11-

There could
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be no doubt but that the appellant and his brother received
stolen property.

It is no mystery as to where, when and from

whom the property was stolen.

The only significant factual

questions are whether the property with which they were
caught red handed and concerning which they were planning to
sell (see Tr.73,74) was stolen by both of them or by which
one if not by both.

The jury found a reasonable doubt as

to appellant's brother's guilt upon the basis of his
testimony.

It is inescapable from the evidence in this

case and from logic that one or both of the defendants
committed the burglary.

The issue was not whether either

defendant was guilty or innocent of the burglary but only
which brother was guilty if both were not.

Any error

in the instructions in connection with the conviction of
a guilty burglar was harmless error now that the other
brother was found not guilty.
This Court has never held, and should not now,
that the requested instruction must be given in a
circumstantial case (and especially not when a direct
evidence offense is tried in the same proceeding)#

when

the reasonable hypothesis of innocence is not established
in the record~

To require that such be established as

a condition for requiring it being given would not
per se require a defendant to testify and expose himself
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to self incrimination on cross examination as a reasonable
hypothesis in many cases could be established by other
witnesses or other evidence.

In the event it cannot be

established otherwise, however, respondent submits it
would not be unfair for the defendant to choose between
testifying and receiving the benefit of that instruction
or to remain silent and not have such an instruction.

In

the latter situation, as in this case, the defendant would
have the benefit of the beyond a reasonable doubt instruction
and could argue that any hypothesis, however fanciful or
unsubstantiated in the record, should be sufficient in the
juro~'s

mind to return a verdict of not guilty.
In the case of Mcwilliams v. State, 294 So.2d 454

(Court of Criminal Appeals_ of Alabama, 1974), the appellant
requested "Charge No. 15--I charge you, members of the
jury, that you must find the defendant not guilty if the
conduct of the defendant upon a reasonable hypothesis
is consistent with defendant's innocence."
court refused the instruction.

The trial

Said- appellate court

said on this point:
While refused charge fifteen was
held to be a proper charge in Gregory v.
State, 140 Ala. 11, 27 So. 259, the
more recent Appellate Court opinions are
committed to the view that the refusal
of this charge is not error since said
charge is not hypothesized on the
evidence. Foster v. State, 37 Ala·.App.
213, 66 So.2d 204 and authorities
therein
cited.
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The above case was cited favorable and applied in
the later case of Wiggins v. State, 347 So.2d 543 (Ala.
Cr. App. 1977).
CONCLUSION
Appellant has not established a sound legal basis
to overturn the judgment of guilt of burglary and receiving
stolen property.

Those judgments should therefor be affirmed,
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent
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copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to
Verhoef, Attorney for Appellant, 431 South 300
104, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 15th day
1980.

true and correc
Mr. Martin
East, Suite
of December,
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